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ORDERING A NEW TRIAL AFTER SUSTAINING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO CORRECT ERRORS UNDER INDIANA TRIAL
RULE 59 ALLEGING INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN A
NONJURY TRIAL
Indiana Trial Rule 591 governs courts' rulings on motions to correct
errors. If a court sustains a motion to correct errors, Trial Rule 59 gives
it broad discretion in determining the appropriate relief.2  However, in
some circumstances constitutional and policy considerations should limit
the exercise of this statutory discretion. For example, when a court sus-
tains a criminal defendant's motion to correct errors alleging insufficient
evidence in a nonjury trial, two kinds of relief appear to be available.
Trial Rule 59 could be interpreted to permit the court to order either a
new judgment under 59(E) (7)3 or a new trial pursuant to 59(A) 4 and
59(E) (1).' Recently in Eskridge v. State,6 the Indiana Supreme Court
1. IND. TRIAL R. 59. This Rule is made applicable to criminal trials by IND. CRIM.
R. 16:
Trial Rule 59 (Motion to Correct Errors) will apply to criminal proceedings
insofar as applicable and when not in conflict with any specific rule adopted by
this court for the conduct of criminal procedure.
2. (E) Relief granted on motion to correct errors. The court, if it deter-
mines that prejudicial or harmful error has been committed, shall take such
action as will cure the error, including without limitation the following with re-
spect to all or some of the parties and all or some of the issues:
(1) Grant a new trial;
(2) Enter final judgment;
(3) Alter, amend, modify or correct judgment;
(4) Amend or correct the findings or judgment as provided in Rule 52(b);
(5) In the case of excessive or inadequate damages, enter final judgment
on the evidence for the amount of the proper damages, grant a new trial, or
grant a new trial subject to additur or remittitur;
(6) Grant any other appropriate relief, or make relief subject to condition;
or
(7) In reviewing the evidence, the court shall grant a new trial if it de-
termines that the verdict of a non-advisory jury is against the weight of the
evidence; and shall enter judgment, subject to the provisions herein, if the
court determines that the verdict of a nonadvisory jury is clearly erroneous as
contrary to or not supported by the evidence, or if the court determines that the
findings and judgment upon issues tried without a jury or with an advisory jury
are against the weight of the evidence .
IND. TRIAL R. 59(E).
3. IND. TRIAL R. 59(E) (7).
4. (A) Motion to correct errors-When granted. The court upon its own
motion or the motion of any of the parties for or against all or any of the
parties and upon all or part of the issues shall enter an order for the correction
of errors occurring prior to the filing thereof, including, without limitation,
the following . . ..
IND. TRIAL R. 59(A).
5. IND. TRIAL R. 59(E) (1).
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held that a new trial order was permissible in these circumstances. The
court's approval of this relief in a nonjury, criminal case contradicts the
explicit language of Trial Rule 59(E) (7), subjects the defendant to
double jeopardy and violates basic policies of criminal justice. This note
will examine these objections in greater detail.
TRIAL RULE 59
Subsection (E) of Trial Rule 59 enables the court, upon sustaining
a motion to correct errors, to "take such action as will cure the error"
by ordering any one of several specified remedies or any other appropriate
relief.7 One of the listed remedies is to grant a new trial.' The Eskridge
court relied exclusively on this provision of the rule in upholding the trial
court's new trial order.9 However, subsection (E) (7) appears to limit
the general rule of subsection (E) (1)1" by making new trials unavailable
6. Eskridge v. State, - Ind. - , 281 N.E.2d 490 (1972).
Eskridge involved a prosecution for possession of narcotic drug administering para-
phernalia with intent to violate a provision of a state statute. IND. CODE § 35-24-1-2
(1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3 5 20(c) (Supp. 1970). The defendant waived arraign-
ment, pleaded not guilty and waived trial by jury. At trial, the State of Indiana sub-
mitted its evidence and rested. Defendant then moved for discharge, which was over-
ruled, and the defendant then rested without submitting any evidence. The court found
defendant guilty. Pursuant to Trial Rule 59 defendant subsequently filed a motion to
correct errors alleging insufficient evidence of intent. The motion stated:
There was absolutely no evidence of intent to administer and use narcotic
drugs. . . . No narcotics were found and there was no evidence of the requi-
site intent. . . . This defendant should . . . be discharged . . . .
Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 3-4, 281 N.E.2d 490. The trial court sustained the mo-
tion to correct errors. Then, instead of discharging defendant, the trial court ordered a
new trial. Defendant subsequently moved for discharge on the grounds that a new trial
would place her in double jeopardy, but the motion was overruled by the trial court. De-
fendant was again tried, found guilty, and sentenced to one to five years in the Indiana
State Women's Prison. Defendant then filed her second motion to correct errors, which
was overruled. The Indiana Supreme Court in a four to one decision upheld the trial
court's ordering of the new trial.
After the first trial, but before the hearing on the defendant's first motion to cor-
rect errors, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed, for insufficient evidence of intent, a
conviction for violating the same statute under which the defendant in Eskridge was
charged. Taylor v. State, - Ind. - , 267 N.E.2d 383 (1971). In Taylor, the court
reversed and remanded with an order that the appellant be discharged. The defendant
in Taylor had been convicted in a nonjury trial by the same trial court in which the de-
fendant in Eskridge was being tried. A potential issue in Eskridge was the propriety of
giving the state a chance to rehabilitate its case in light of the Taylor holding. However,
the Indiana Supreme Court in Eskridge makes no mention of this issue.
7. IND. TRIAL R. 59(E).
8. Id. 59(E) (1).
9. Eskridge v. State, - Ind. , ,281 N.E.2d 490, 493 (1972).
10. The court apparently reasons that (E) (1) is a blanket grant of authority to a
trial court to order a new trial after sustaining a motion to correct errors. This author-
ity would be reviewable only as an abuse of discretion. Under this analysis, (E) (7)
would then become a mere list of specific instances wherein this authority could be ex-
ercised. However, such an interpretation makes (E) (7) superfluous. Therefore,
(E) (7) must be construed as limiting (E) (1), if it is to have any effect at all.
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where a court in a nonjury trial determines that the judgment is against
the weight of the evidence. Two basic rules of statutory interpretation
mandate this conclusion.
First, subsection (E) (7) makes the new judgment compulsory while
the new trial remedy under subsection (E) (1) is merely permissive."
While (E) (1) simply states that the court may "[g]rant a new trial,"12
(E) (7) specifies instances in which a new trial and in which a new judg-
ment must be ordered. Subsection (E) (7) provides that where the de-
cision is against the weight of the evidence the court shall order a new
trial if the verdict was by jury and a new verdict if the case was tried to
the judge alone.
Second, under traditional rules of statutory interpretation the specific
provision, (E) (7), must govern the more general (E) (1)." 3 This would
mean that the rule permits only the entry of a new judgment where the
evidence in a nonjury trial is insufficient. Further, interpreting Trial
Rule 59 so as not to permit a new trial in these circumstances avoids pos-
sible constitutional infirmities of a new trial order.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
If, as in Eskridge," a defendant's motion to correct errors is based
on the prosecution's failure to prove a material element of the offense in
a nonjury case, a trial court's decision to order a new trial presents serious
double jeopardy problems.1" "[Diouble jeopardy is a rule of finality:
11. This is the position adopted in Justice DeBruler's persuasive dissent in Eskridge.
- nd. at - , 281 N.E.2d at 494-95.
Trial Rule 59 is among the Indiana Rules of Procedure adopted by the Indiana Su-
preme Court in 1969 when Justice DeBruler was Chief Justice.
12. IND. TRIAL R. 59(E) (1).
13. It is a rule of right reason that general words may be qualified by particu-
lar clauses of a statute, but that on the other hand a thing which is given in
particular shall not be taken away by general words. . . [W]here a general
intention is expressed in a statute, and the act also expresses a particular in-
tention, incompatible with the general intention, the particular intention shall be
considered as an exception.
T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND Ap-
MLCATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 423 (1857). See also F. McCAF-
FREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 35-36 (1953).
14. Eskridge v. State, - Ind. - , 281 N.E.2d 490 (1972).
15. [N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb ....
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy was held enforceable
against the states through the fourteenth amendment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1968). Protection against double jeopardy is also provided by the State of In-
diana in its constitution:
No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.
IND. CONST. art. I, § 14.
In a nonjury trial jeopardy attaches after the trial has been entered upon, Hasse v.
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a single fair trial on a criminal charge bars reprosecution."' 6  The courts,
however, have developed exceptions to the rule. The exceptions arguably
applicable to the Eskridge situation are the "manifest necessity" excep-
tion and the appeal exception.
Manifest Necessity Exception
An exception to the double jeopardy protection is created when a.
mistrial is ordered either with the defendant's consent 7 or upon the court's
determination that there is "manifest necessity" for the mistrial. 8 In
an Eskridge-type situation the defendant seeks to correct the finding of the
first trial and does not want a new trial. 9 Thus, there is no consent by
the defendant to justify a new trial. However, a mistrial ordered without
the consent of defendant may be justified if the court, taking all circum-
State, 8 Ind. App. 488, 36 N.E. 54 (1894), and jeopardy will attach where the cause
of the first aborted trial is prosecutorial error rather than independent operation of a.
state procedural rule, Crim v. State, - Ind. App. - , 294 N.E.2d 822, 829-30 (1973)
(Query: Is this decision designed more to prevent prosecution error than to enforce the
policies behind double jeopardy protection?). Furthermore, "the Double Jeopardy Clause
. . . is written in terms of potential or risk of trial and conviction, not punishment."
Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970). Thus, the defendant in an Eskridge situation
has been put in jeopardy at the first trial.
Justice DeBruler, dissenting in Eskridge, argues that the trial judge must review the
evidence in order to pass upon the motion to correct errors. The sustaining of the mo-
tion, therefore, constitutes a finding of not guilty in a nonjury case, Eskridge v. State,
- Ind. - , - , 281 N.E2d 490, 494-95 (1972) (dissenting opinion), and the de-
fendant may not be retried without violating the double jeopardy protection, Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy-
applicable to state through fourteenth amendment embodies collateral estoppel as a con-
stitutional requirement) ; Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1968) (double jeopardy pro-
hibition held applicable to states through fourteenth amendment) ; United States v. Ball,
163 U.S. 662 (1896) (acquittal bars subsequent prosecution for same offense) ; Dunn v-
State, 70 Ind. 47 (1880) (acquittal bars retrial for same offense).
16. Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Y.aE L.J. 262, 277 (1965).
Double jeopardy shares the purposes of civil law rules of finality; it protects the
defendant from continuing distress, enables him to consider the matter closed and
to plan ahead accordingly, and saves both the public and defendant the cost of
redundant litigation. But double jeopardy is not simply res judicata dressed in
prison grey. It was called forth more by oppression than by crowded calendars.
It equalizes, in some measure, the adversary capabilities of grossly unequal liti-
gants. It reflects not only our demand for speedy justice, but all of our civilized
caution about criminal law-our respect for a jury verdict and the presumption
of innocence, our aversion to needless punishment, our distinction between prose-
cution and persecution.
Id. at 277-78 (footnotes omitted).
17. See Crim v. State, - Ind. App. ,-, 294 N.E.2d 822, 829 (1973).
18. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824). See also Wade v. Hunter, 336
UqS. 684, 689-90 (1949); Crim v. State, - Ind. App. -, -, 294 N.E.2d 822,
829-30 (1973).
19. The defendant in Eskridge had not asked for a new trial in her motion to cor-
rect errors, Brief for Defendant at 3-4, and objected to the ordering of a new trial,
- Ind. at -, 281 N.E.2d at 491. Therefore, it could not be argued that defendant
consented to the new trial.
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stances into consideration, determines that there is a "manifest necessity"
for a mistrial so that the ends of public justice will not be defeated.2" This
rule gives the trial judge great discretion in determining whether a mani-
fest necessity exists.
However, the United States Supreme Court has set some limits to
this discretion. In a case analogous to Eskridge, the Court held that there
was no manifest necessity to justify the -trial court's granting of a mis-
trial at the request of the prosecutor who, after the jury was sworn, had
been unable, due to negligence, to produce a witness who was necessary
to prove two of the six counts of the indictment.2 ' There is an even
stronger argument against manifest necessity for a new trial after a full
trial, as in Eskridge'2 where the prosecution has had a full opportunity to
20. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824). See also Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S.
684, 689-90 (1949).
21. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
The United IStates Supreme Court has also held that it is an abuse of discretion in
determining manifest necessity for a trial judge to order a mistrial on his own motion,
after the first witness is called, without opportunity for reflection or the consideration
of less drastic alternatives. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
22. The only apparent explanation for the Eskridge decision is the Indiana Supreme
Court's distaste for allowing the defendant to escape conviction through the "technical
ground" of insufficient evidence. "Technical ground" has the negative connotation of
an archaic, obscure, or insignificant point of law which has no bearing dn the merits of
the case. Such a term hardly seems an appropriate description of failure to provide one
of the two essential substantive elements of a crime. The term "technical ground" is
especially inappropriate in this particular case because the intent provision is so clearly
spelled out in the statute under which defendant was prosecuted. It is difficult to under-
stand how insufficient evidence as to this essential substantive element can be called a
"technical ground," especially when the majority opinion itself states:
It is clear that under Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno., § 10-3520(c), 1970 Supp., intent
• . . is an element of the crime which must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt by the state.
Eskridge v. State, - Ind. , , 281 N.E.2d 490, 492 (1972).
Referring to insufficient evidence as a "technical ground" is also incongruous in
light of the facts that the presumption of innocence is a "bedrock 'axiomatic and elemen-
tary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law,'" In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970), citing Coffin v. United States,
156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895), and that the United States Supreme Court has explicitly
held that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged." 397 U.S. at 364. If it is a bedrock principle of our criminal law
that one is presumed innocent until proven guilty of a criminal charge, and if the Con-
stitution of the United iStates provides that one is not proven guilty of a criminal charge
until every element of that charge is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, insufficient evi-
dence as to one of the two major elements of a criminal charge cannot properly be clas-
sified as a "technical ground."
To state that insufficient evidence is a "technical ground" and to uphold the ordering
of a new trial under the circumstances present in Eskridge would seem directly opposed
to the policy underlying the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy:
The . . . idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence, . . . that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for
an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal
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present its case.2"
Appeal Exception
The most frequently applied exception to the double jeopardy prohi-
bition, the appeal exception, provides that a defendant may be retried after
a reversal on appeal."4 While the majority rule is to permit application of
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as
well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
It is distressing to read the concluding comments of the majority opinion in
Eskridge as it states:
In our opinion the appellant here was given justice and due process and was
guilty as a second trial revealed. We do not feel she is entitled to escape
through a technicality such as is being urged.
- Ind. at - , 281 N.E.2d at 494. Such comments seem highly inappropriate in an
opinion which deals with the.question of wfiether or not the second trial should have
occurred at all. The accused in Eskridge was innocent until proven guilty, and there
was insufficient evidence to prove her guilty at the first trial. To use the end result of
the second trial to justify allowing the second trial to be held at all reflects faulty rea-
soning and indicates that the majority has ignored or is insensitive to the fact that even
an innocent defendant might be found guilty through repeated prosecutions.
Finally, a defendant should have a right to an error-free trial. If it were too great
a price to pay to let a defendant off completely, then few reversals would occur.
23. The United States Supreme Court in a five to four decision in Illinois v. Somer-
ville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973), upheld the trial court's grant of a mistrial upon discovery
of a defective indictment after the jury had been sworn, but before any evidence was
taken. The indictment had failed to allege intent, and such a defect under Illinois law
required reversal of conviction if the point were raised on appeal or in a habeas corpus
proceeding. Sonmerville cannot be reconciled with Downum v. United States, 372 U.S.
734 (1963), and may indicate a shift in position by the new Court. The Court in
Somerville expressed concern with the early deprival of the State's opportunity to con-
vict defendant, and held that the mistrial was required by manifest necessity and the
ends of public justice. In an Eskridge-type situation the State has had a full opportunity
to convict the defendant.
In Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961), the United States Supreme Court
upheld the declaration of a mistrial, upon the court's own motion, during the presentation
of the government's case. A major reason for allowing mistrial and reprosecution in
this case was that the court's action was for the defendant's benefit. The trial 6ourt's
ordering of a new trial in an Eskridge situation is not for the defendant's benefit, since
the defendant is to be needlessly subjected to the ordeal of a criminal prosecution a
second time. See note 16 supra & text accompanying.
24. The Eskridge decision relies heavily upon the exception to double jeopardy pro-
tection for a defendant whose conviction is set aside because of an error in the proceed-
ings, United 1States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964) (reindictment permissible after original
conviction reversed because of coerced guilty plea).
Tateo appears to be based upon a combination of waiver theory and concern for
sound administration of justice. The waiver theory is not properly applicable to a
motion to correct errors at the trial court level. See notes 29-37 infra & text accompany-
ing. Moreover, in an Eskridge-type situation the State has had a full opportunity to
convict the defendant, so the ends of public justice are not defeated.
See also Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960) (reindictment permissible af-
ter original conviction reversed for error in jury instructions) ; Stroud v. United States,
251 U.S. 15 (1919) (reindictment permissible after conviction reversed because of con-
fession of error) ; United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) (reindictment permissible
after original indictment found defective).
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the appeal exception even where the ground for reversal is insufficient
evidence, the rule has been persuasively criticized by scholars" and state
courts26 as violative of the double jeopardy prohibition. An early Supreme
Court case adopting the majority rule2 has since been undercut by the
Court's later decisions.28 Even if the double jeopardy exception continues
to be allowed where the appellate reversal is based on insufficiency of the
evidence, the exception should not be permitted in the quite different
situation where the determination of insufficient evidence is made, not by
an appellate court, but by a trial judge in a nonjury case. There are three
theories used to support the appeal exception, none of which would justify
allowing a double jeopardy exception in the Eskridge-type situation.
Under the first, the waiver theory, the criminal defendant who ap-
peals his or her conviction is deemed to have waived double jeopardy pro-
tection.29 To assert that a defendant who faces imprisonment freely
chooses to waive his or her defense of double jeopardy to correct an er-
roneous conviction is "wholly fictional."' Waiver of a fundamental con-
stitutional right should not be a Hobson's choice.3 Further, a determina-
25. Cahan, Granting the State a New Trial After an Appellate Rdversal for In-
sufficient Evidence, 57 ILL. B.J. 448 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cahan]. This article
was the annual Lincoln Award winner for 1969.
26. See People v. Brown, 99 Ill. App. 2d 281, 241 N.E2d 653 (1968); State v.
Moreno, 69 N.M. 113, 364 P.2d 594 (1961). These jurisdictions hold that the effect of
an appellate reversal should not differ from the effect of a trial court's acquittal on the
same ground.
27. Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950).
28. Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416, 426 (1960), citing 6apir v. United
States, 348 U.S. 373, 374 (1955) (concurring opinion). See also Note, Double Jeopardy:
A New Trial After Appellate Reversal for Insufficient Evidence, 31 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 365,
365-67 (1964).
29. Cahan, supra note 25, at 452-54.
The Eskridge majority appears to rely upon the waiver theory for justification of
the appeal exception and gives only cursory attention to the fact that this exception ap-
plies only to appellate courts ordering new trials as opposed to trial courts ordering new
trials after defendant's motion to correct errors. In fact, the majority entirely avoids
grappling with the difference, dismissing it as "[t]he only distinction" between Eskridge
and appellate application of the appeal exception. Eskridge v. State, - Ind. at -, 281
N.E.2d at 493. Such superficial treatment of this critical distinction hardly seems ap-
propriate when a fundamental constitutional guarantee is at stake.
While the motion to correct errors is a condition to an appeal under Trial Rule
59(G), it is primarily an opportunity for the trial court to correct its own errors.
IND. TRIAL R. 59.
The waiver theory has been substantially undermined by the United States Supreme
Court in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), where the Court held that one
who appeals his conviction may not be given a more severe sentence upon retrial and
reconviction unless the court gives affirmative, objective reasons concerning the de-
fendant's conduct subsequent to the first sentencing.
30. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1957).
31. [Waiver] . . . connotes some kind of voluntary knowing relinquishment
of a right . . . [I]t is wholly fictional to say that he 'chooses' to forego his
454
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tion that the double jeopardy protection has been waived should be made
-only after an inquiry into the specific facts of each case. Allowing a fic-
tional waiver of the constitutional right against double jeopardy is incon-
sistent with the voluntary, intelligent and knowing waiver required for
relinquishing other fundamental constitutional rights.32 A guarantee
which has been considered so important as to merit express mention in
both the United States Constitution8 and the Indiana constitution84 can-
not be taken away by judicial assumption of a waiver." In addition, one
has constitutional rights both to double jeopardy protection and to pro-
cedural due process." Courts should not require the forfeiture of one
fundamental constitutional right in order to assert another."
Even if the waiver theory were tenable it would not be applicable to
the defendant making a motion to correct errors as in Eskridge. A de-
fendant may view an appeal to a different, higher court as a new phase, a
different level, or a new step; whereas the motion to correct errors at the
trial court level may be viewed as merely another transaction, perhaps
perfunctory or pro fornw, before the same tribunal. Therefore, it is sig-
nificantly less likely that a defendant moving to correct errors at the trial
court level would be aware of the possible consequences of his or her
action.
A second theory sometimes used to justify the exception to the double
jeopardy protection for one who appeals his conviction is the continuing
jeopardy theory.8 Under this theory, jeopardy is considered to continue
through appeals and new trials. The continuing jeopardy theory lacks
merit because its logic would allow the state to appeal a judgment of
constitutional defense of former jeopardy . . . . [if] . . . he has no meaning-
ful choice.
Id.
32. Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269 (1942) (waiver of trial by jury must be
express and intelligent) ; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (constitutional prohi-
bition against guilty plea that is not voluntary) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)(required intentional waiver of a known right to counsel).
.33. U+S. CoNsT. amend. V.
34. IND. CONST. art. I, § 14.
35. As Mr. Justice Holmes once stated:
Usually no such waiver is expressed or thought of. Moreover, it cannot be
imagined that the law would deny to a prisoner the correction of a fatal error,
unless he should waive other rights so important as to be saved by an express
clause in the Constitution of the United States.
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 135 (1904) (dissenting opinion). See People v.
Iaconis, 29 Mich. App. 443, 185 N.W.2d 609 (1971).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV.
37. Cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
38. See Cahan, supra note 25, at 454-55.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
acquittal. 9 Such an appeal is not permitted.4"
A third theory, that of erasure, is sometimes used to justify retrial
of a defendant whose conviction has been set aside on appeal. 1 Under
this theory, the first trial is considered erased from the record when it is
set aside. The theory is more of a tautology than a justification. If
retrial is considered to wipe out the existence of the prior trial the double
jeopardy clause would be rendered meaningless.42
None of these theories, then, supports the result reached in Eskridge.
In addition to the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, how-
ever, other persuasive reasons counsel against the result reached in that
case.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
There are a number of policy considerations, in addition to the statu-
tory and constitutional arguments, against permitting a new trial after
the granting of a motion to correct errors alleging insufficient evidence
in a nonjury trial.
First, unrestricted ordering of new trials on motions to correct er-
rors could lead to habitual retrial of criminal cases. This would result in
poor judicial economy, unnecessary additional expense to the public and
to the individual, and lowered public respect for the fairness and efficiency
of the judicial system. Furthermore, unrestricted ordering of new trials
could result in an indefinite number of retrials of an accused. The poli-
cies of double jeopardy and the right of an accused to have his or her
39. Id.
Even if this theory is accepted, it does not apply to the Eskridge situation, since
the sustaining of the motion is, in essence, a finding of not guilty which terminates
jeopardy and bars retrial. Eskridge v. State, - Ind. , , 281 N.E.2d 490,
494-95 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
40. While the prosecution may appeal a question of law after an acquittal to the
Indiana Supreme Court, the iSupreme Court is not authorized to reverse the judgment,
but only to "pronounce an opinion upon the correctness of the decision of the trial
court." IND. CoDE § 35-1-43-2 (1971), IN. ANN. STAT. § 9-2102 (1956). The prosecu-
tion cannot question by appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict.
State v. Valkenberg, 60 Ind. 302 (1878) ; State v. Hall, 58 Ind. 512 (1877) ; State v.
Phillip ', 25 Ind. App. 579, 58 N.E. 727 (1900).
41. See State v. Robinson, 100 Ohio App. 466, 137 N.E.2d 141 (1956).
42. See Cahan, supra note 25, at 455. See also Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329
(1970).
Another argument supporting the discharge of a defendant in the Eskridge situation
is that the granting of a motion to correct errors on the ground of insufficient evidence
is effectively an acquittal. See United ,States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892) ; West v.
State, 22 N.J.L. 212 (1849). Under Illinois law, for example, the acquittal is considered
to occur when a jury makes the finding that there is insufficient evidence for conviction.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-4(a) (1) (Smith-Hurd 1972) ; People v. Drymalski, 22 Ill2d
347, 175 N.E2d 553 (1961).
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guilt or innocence finally determined oppose such a practice.4 3
Second, this practice may make the judge an ally of the prosecution,
when the judge should be a neutral magistrate. There is a dlstinction
between an error attributable to the court and prosecution failure to pro-
vide the material elements necessary for conviction. In the former case
the court corrects its own error, while in the latter the court rescues the
prosecution from the prosecution's own error.
Third, ordering a new trial at the appellate level after reversal for
insufficient evidence 4 involves different considerations from ordering a
new trial at the nonjury trial level. The United States Supreme Court
has held that appellate reversals and new trial orders do not constitute
double jeopardy.4" In an appeal, an appellate court, being reluctant to
overturn the findings of another court because it has not had the oppor-
tunity to observe the proceedings and the demeanor of witnesses, may find
it desirable to order a new trial. However, in a nonjury case, a trial court
itself is deciding upon the motion to correct errors: The reluctance to
overturn the judgment of another court is not present. While it may be
embarrassing for a trial court to admit its own error, such embarrassment
is probably significantly less than that experienced in having a higher
court correct the error."'
Fourth, even if it could accurately be determined that failure to pro-
vide sufficient evidence were an oversight or inadvertance, the prosecu-
tion should not be rescued from its careless preparation. Rescue could
condone and encourage this caliber of performance or allow the prosecu-
tion to cover up its mistakes through a new trial. The prosecution should
not be allowed to use the first trial as a "dry run for [a] second prose-
cution."4"
43. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 668 (1896).
In a similar discussion, Mr. Justice Harlan has stated: "Lack of preparedness by
the Government . ..directly implicates policies underpinning both the double jeopardy
provision and the speedy trial guarantee." United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486
(1971).
44. Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950), a case heavily relied on by the
Eskridge majority, holds that a court of appeals may direct a new trial after a reversal
for insufficient evidence. This holding was based on the appellate "waiver" of double
jeopardy theory. See also notes 29-37 supra & text accompanying.
45. Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950).
46. While it can be argued that courts will be reluctant to sustain motions to cor-
rect errors if unable to grant new trials, Rule 59(E) (7) limits the requirements of a
new judgment to specific instances and provides options in the form of alternative judg-
ments.
47. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970). In Cornero v. United States, 48
F.2d 69, 71 (9th Cir. 1931), the court stated:
The fact is that, when the district attorney impaneled the jury without first
ascertaining whether or not his witnesses were present, he took a chance.
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Fifth, repeated prosecutions of an accused for the same offense "en-
hanc[e] the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty."48  Since "a fundamental value determination of our society [is]
that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go
free,"" 9 the Eskridge interpretation of Trial Rule 59 could lead to un-
founded doubts about -the innocence of a defendant who is retried after
the prosecution failed in its initial attempt to obtain a conviction. There
is also thd possibilty that after seeing the results of the first trial, a frus-
trated or overzealous prosecutor, police officer or other person might fab-
ricate evidence to assure conviction at the second trial.
Sixth, .the Eskridge interpretation of Trial Rule 59 makes it easier
for the prosecution to present new evidence and obtain a new trial than
for the defendant." The Indiana Supreme Court has ruled that only if a
defendant's newly-produced evidence in a motion to correct errors meets
nine requirements, may the trial court grant a new trial.9 Under
Eskridge, the defendant's showing of prosecution failure to produce evi-
dence of a material element automatically allowed the prosecution to have
a new trial. There appears to be no requirement that the new evidence
even exist !2 The prosecution not only need nbt meet the requirements
48. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
49. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (concurring opinion).
50. In a nonjury case subsequent to Eskridge the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the
decision of a trial court not to open a judgment to hear the defendant's new evidence.
Cansler v. State, - Ind. - , 281 N.E.2d 881 (1972). After the finding of guilty.
but before the sentencing, the defendant moved to open the judgment on the grounds of
newly discovered evidence. The motion was overruled and defendant then filed a motion
to correct errors to which was attached a sworn affidavit signed by an alibi witness.
The trial court refused to open the judgment to hear the new evidence.
Justice DeBruler's majority opinion in Cansler notes however, that a trial court does
possess the power to reopen a judgment to hear additional tvidence without granting a
whole new trial either upon a motion made prior to a motion to correct errors or upon a
motion to correct errors. - Ind. at -, 281 N.E.2d at 883.
51. An application for a new trial, made on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, must be supported by affidavit and such affidavit or affidavits must
contain a statement of facts showing (1) that the evidence has been discovered
since the trial; (2) that it is material and relevant; (3) that it is not cumulative;
(4) that it is not merely impeaching; (5) that it is not privileged or incompe-
tent; (6) that due diligence was used to discover it in time for trial; (7) that
the evidence is worthy of credit; (8) that it can be produced upon a retrial of
the case; and (9) that it will probably produce a different result.
Tungate v. State, 238 Ind. 48, 54-55, 147 N.E.2d 232, 235-36 (1958), cited in Cansler v.
State, - Ind. - , - , 281 N.E.2d 881, 883 (1972).
52. There is no written transcript of the first trial or the April 2, 1971, hearing
during which the motion to correct errors was discussed and sustained and the new trial
ordered. However, at no time did the prosecution present any indication to the court
that the evidence needed was in its possession. The court seems to have assumed that
it was. Minutes of the Court, Marion County Criminal Court, Division One, and Edi-
son Voicewriter Disc audio records of the first trial and of the hearing were used to
gather this information. Cause No. CR71-0253.
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imposed on defendants, but it may benefit from the defendant's substantial
efforts to prove prosecution failures. These inconsistent practices are
arbitrary, especially in light of the adversaries' unequal resources and
power. If preferential freatment is to be given, it should be given to the
weaker party, not the stronger.r
Finally, the current state of Trial Rule 59 creates uncertainty for the
practicing lawyer. "The bar requires a definitive answer in order ade-
quately to advise a criminal defendant . . . ""' A lawyer should be able
to advise his client of the rights he will surrender by filing a motion to,
correct errors, what effect asserting insufficient evidence in the motion
will have upon the remedy, and what remedy will be granted by the trial
court if the motion is sustained. Under the wording of Trial Rule
59(E) (7) the trial court would be required to enter judgment. The
Eskridge decision creates uncertainty as to whether the court will enter
judgment or whether the court might upon its own motion order a new
trial. This sort of uncertainty in the law "diminishes popular confidence
in the law and lawyers."55 As former Chief Justice Warren has observed:
No general respect for, nor adherence to, the law as a whole can
well be expected without judicial recognition of the paramount
need for prompt, eminently fair and sober criminal law pro-
cedures. The methods we employ in the enforcement of our
criminal law have aptly been called the measures by which the
quality of our civilization may be judged. 8
CONCLUSION
Trial Rule 59(E) (7) requiring a new judgment is the appropriate
rule to be applied in a nonjury, criminal trial when a motion to correct
errors alleging insufficient evidence is sustained. The interpretation of
Trial Rule 59 chosen by the Indiana Supreme Court does not properly fall
under any exception to the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy. Even if the court's interpretation can be justified on theoreti-
cal grounds, serious policy considerations demand its reappraisal.
DENNIS L. MOESCHL
It should be noted that the prosecution was given at least eight days to prepare an
explanation of why the motion to correct errors should not be sustained. Minutes of the
Court, Marion County Criminal Court, Division One, Cause No. CR71-0253; Brief for
Defendant at 4.
53. Downun v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 738 (1963) ; United States v. Tateo,
377 U.S. 463, 475 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
54. Cahan, supra note 25, at 463.
55. Id.
56. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962).
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